This paper studies the relationship between patients' socio-economic status and general practitioners' (GPs') service provision by exploiting administrative patient-level data with information on consultation length, medical tests, and fee payments for each visit in Norway over a 5-year period (2008)(2009)(2010)(2011)(2012). To reduce patient heterogeneity, we limit the sample to a given condition, diabetes type II, that is treated almost exclusively in primary care. We estimate GP fixedeffect models and control for a wide set of patient characteristics. Our results show that, for each visit, patients with low education get shorter consultations but more medical tests, patients with low income get less of both, and patients with low education/income get less services in monetary terms. We also find that, during a year, patients with low education/income visit the GP more often and receive more services in monetary terms. Thus, GPs treat patients differently according to their socio-economic status, but we find no support for a social gradient.
In our empirical analysis, we exploit unique administrative data with patient-level information on the services provided by general practitioners (GPs). The dataset covers the whole population in Norway and contains detailed information on all services provided by the GPs' at each visit over a 5-year period from 2008 to 2012.
A key challenge is to account for patient heterogeneity, especially that patients with low SES tend to be in worse health and, thus, in need of more (or better) care than patients with high SES. To limit this problem, we restrict our sample to patients with a given condition, diabetes type II, that is treated almost exclusively in primary care. This has two advantages. First, patient heterogeneity is necessarily lower within than across conditions. Second, patient selection is less of a concern for conditions with no or limited need for specialist care. In addition, the data allow us to control for a wide set of patient characteristics that are likely to capture the need for medical care. The allocation of healthcare may also be driven by GP heterogeneity. 4 To account for this, we estimate GP fixed-effect models that control for all timeinvariant GP characteristics. Using education and income as SES indicators, we obtain the following results. Patients with low education receive shorter consultations but more medical tests per visit. Patients with low income receive less of both, although the effects are very small. 5 We rationalise these findings in a theoretical model, where the quality of consultation is increasing in patients' communicative (or cognitive) skills, which are likely to more correlated with education than with income. However, our empirical analysis also finds that patients with low SES receive less services per visit when measured in monetary terms. To explore whether this could indicate a social gradient in the allocation of healthcare, we analyse the GPs' service provision during a calendar year. The results show that patients with low education or income visit the GP more often and receive overall more services (in monetary terms). Moreover, patients with low education are more likely to receive at least two glycated haemoglobin (HbA1c) tests per year, as recommended by the medical guidelines for diabetes. Thus, our results show that GPs' treat patients differently according to SES, but we find no evidence of a social gradient in their allocation of healthcare.
The literature on the relationship between SES and health is vast (Cutler, Lleras-Muney, & Vogl, 2008) . Our study relates to the part that focuses on the role of healthcare provision. One strand focuses on utilisation and access to healthcare. 6 For instance, Roos, Walld, Uhanova, and Bond (2005) find that poor people in urban areas in Canada with ambulatory care sensitive conditions have more physician visits and hospitalisation related to ambulatory care. Dunlop, Coyte, and McIsaac (2000) find that Canadians with lower incomes and fewer years of schooling visit GPs at a higher rate but specialists at a lower rate. Kapur et al. (2004) examine the effects of SES on healthcare expenditures and find significant effects for education, income, and wealth. 7 Another strand focuses on inequity in healthcare utilisation. This literature tends to employ survey data, focusing on comparative (cross-country) studies. A key finding is that specialist visits are distributed in favour of high-income individuals whereas GP visits are more equitably distributed (Bago, Uva, & Jones, 2009; Devaux, 2013; Van Doorslaer & Masseria, 2004) . 8, 9 The key contributions of our paper are the following. First, our paper is, to the best of our knowledge, a first comprehensive analysis of physicians' allocation of healthcare according to patients' SES in primary care.
10 While existing literature mainly focuses on the number of visits, our data contain additional information on the GPs' service provision during a visit and the corresponding expenditures based on fee payments to the GPs. Second, our analysis exploits patient-level information based on administrative data, which is particularly rare in the primary care literature. Most 4 The importance of controlling for GP heterogeneity is demonstrated by Grytten and Sørensen (2003) who find substantial variation in service provision across GPs. 5 We conduct several robustness checks of our results. First, we account for patient heterogeneity by including only siblings (with diabetes) in the analysis. Second, we account for self-selection by focusing only on patients that are exogenously assigned a new GP. Third, we examine how the results vary according to GP and patient characteristics. The results are summarised in Section 6 and reported in Appendix B.
6 See, for instance, Cookson et al. (2016) for a review of the literature on socio-economic inequalities in healthcare in England, which reveals a large body of research in the fields of health service and social medicine, mainly focusing on small-area (neighbourhood) variations. 7 There are also recent studies on the relationship between SES and waiting times, as a measure of access to health care; see, for example, Kaarboe and Carlsen (2014) and Monstad, Engesaeter, and Espehaug (2014) .
8 A similar finding is reported for Norway by Grasdal and Monstad (2011). 9 There are also some related papers focusing on GPs' provision of care to diabetes patients; see Iezzi, Bruni, and Ugolini (2014) and Scott, Schurer, Jensen, and Sivey (2009) . Although these papers are mainly concerned with the effect of financing schemes on the provision of care, they also report findings on differences in the distribution of services across patients.
of the recent studies using administrative data are based on small-areas (neighbourhoods) as the unit of observation.
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Although this is an improvement relative to the early literature studying differences across large areas, there are still concerns regarding measurement accuracy and aggregation bias. 12 Third, the data allow us to control for a wide set of patient characteristics such as age, gender, morbidity, and previous use of healthcare, information that is rarely available in primary care studies at individual patient level. Finally, the data enable us to use panel data methods, including GP fixed effect models to account for time-invariant GP heterogeneity.
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| INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
Norway has a National Health Service system financed through general taxation, and there are currently around 4,500 GPs within the National Health Service. All individuals in Norway have the right to be listed with a GP and can switch GP at most twice per calendar year. The GPs can decide the size of their list within the interval 500-2,500.
GPs with an open list will automatically be assigned new patients who apply for being listed with them. Almost 95% of the GPs in Norway are self-employed, receiving a combination of capitation and fee-for-service. 14 The residual 5% of the GPs are publicly employed with fixed-salary contracts. For patients with diabetes, the GPs usually provide comprehensive care, including frequent consultations and medical tests. 15 A standard consultation lasts 20 min but can be prolonged by the GP, which in that case, receives an extra fee for every 15-min consultation time on top of the standard consultation fee. Patients pay copayments for GP consultations and services, but the out-of-pocket payments are in practice very low due to a tight annual expenditure cap. 16 Once the cap is binding, which is usually the case for patients with diabetes or other chronic diseases, all additional healthcare expenditures are fully reimbursed.
| MODEL
Our main empirical question is if and how a patient's SES affects the GP's treatment decisions during a given consultation. To gain some understanding of the potential mechanisms at play, we set up a simple theoretical model that is consistent with the main institutional features of the Norwegian primary care system. A patient visits a GP and obtains a health gain b(q, τ), which depends positively on the quality of the medical consultation (q) and the number of medical tests (τ) undertaken by the GP but at a decreasing rate (b< 0, b ττ < 0). 17 The utility derived from this health gain is given by a strictly concave function U(b). Consultation quality depends positively on the length of the consultation (c) and the SES of the patient (θ > 0). Our key assumption is that a patient with higher SES is better able to communicate the full details of his disease symptoms to the GP, thereby increasing the quality of the consultation for a given consultation length. This logic also implies that the value of increased consultation length depends positively on the patient's SES. We capture these properties by assuming that q = θc.
11 See, for instance, Asaria et al. (2016) . 12 Studies using survey data obtain individual patient information (e.g., Morris, Sutton, & Gravelle, 2005) . However, these studies face other problems, such as reporting and attrition biases (e.g., self-assessed health) and lack time variation in key variables (e.g., healthcare provision). 13 There is no study in the extensive reviews of Cutler et al. (2008) and Cookson et al. (2016) that uses GP fixed effects.
14 The capitation part is flat annual payment per patient on the GP's list. The fee-for-service part is determined by the set of services provided by the GP and the fees vary according to the type of service. 15 Medical guidelines define the treatment standards for diabetes patients. In Norway, these are developed by the Directorate of Health; see www.
helsedirektoratet.no. 16 The annual expenditure cap was NOK 1740 (approx. £ 174) in 2008, and covers copayments related to basically all primary and secondary healthcare, as well as prescription drug expenses. 17 Whereas monotonicity seems a plausible assumption, our analysis can also incorporate the case where the marginal health benefits of consultation quality and medical testing actually become negative (i.e., b q < 0 and b τ < 0) beyond some levels of q and τ. However, such an assumption would not affect the analysis because the optimal solution always lies on the upward sloping part of the respective marginal benefit functions (as long as marginal costs are positive). By defining u(c, τ; θ 
The remaining second-order cross partial derivatives are given by
A sufficient condition for u cτ < 0 is that q and τ are substitutes in the health production function (b qτ < 0). The sign of Equation 2 is also ambiguous, because of two counteracting effects. Since higher SES increases the quality of a given consultation length, this reduces the marginal utility of longer consultations. However, higher SES also makes consultations more productive, which increases the marginal utility of consultation length. The first effect dominates the second if u is sufficiently concave in c. More precisely, u cθ > (<)0 if Φ < (>)1, where Φ ∶ = − u cc c/u c measures the relative degree of concavity of u with respect to c.
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The GP is partly altruistic and care about both patient utility and her own income, with a payoff function given by
where α ∈ (0, 1) is the GP's degree of altruism, p c is the fee received per unit of consultation time, and p τ is the fee received per unit of medical testing. This is in line with the Norwegian system of fee-for-service payments, as explained in Section 2. 19 The GP's costs of medical treatment are given by a convex function G(·), where
The GP chooses c and τ to maximise Equation 3. The optimal service mix given to a patient of type θ equates marginal benefit with marginal cost along each treatment dimension 20 : This result holds under a very reasonable condition of substitutability in the health production function (b qτ ≤ 0) and a rather mild condition on concavity of the patient utility function (Φ ≤ 1). 22 Consider the special case of b qτ = 0 and Φ = 1. Higher SES directly increases the health gain by increasing the value of a given medical consultation. Since U bb < 0, this reduces the marginal utility of medical testing, and the GP optimally chooses a lower number of tests. In turn, this dampens the initial health gain and, therefore, increases the marginal utility of consultation length, which is correspondingly increased. Thus, higher SES implies a substitution away from medical testing and towards longer consultations. 23 This effect is reinforced if consultation and testing are substitutes in the health production function (b qτ < 0), 18 If, for example, u is logarithmic in c, the two effects cancel each other out and Φ = 1, implying u cθ = 0.
19 In the Norwegian system, the payment for consultations is a nonlinear and discontinuous function of consultation time. However, our linear specification captures the key property that consultation payment increases with consultation time. 20 The second-order conditions are given by αu cc − G cc < 0, αu ττ − G ττ < 0, and (αu cc − G cc )(αu ττ − G ττ ) − (αu cτ − G cτ ) 2 > 0, which we assume to be satisfied. 21 The proof of Proposition 1 is given in Appendix A. 22 If longer or better consultations improve the accuracy of medical diagnosing, fewer tests might be needed, which implies that consultation quality and medical testing are substitutes (b qτ ≤ 0). 23 By continuity, such a substitution also appears for a set of parameter values in the neighbourhood of b qτ = 0 and Φ = 1, including parameters that yield b qτ > 0 and Φ > 1. and it is even further reinforced if Φ < 1, which implies that higher SES directly induces the GP to increase the length of the consultation because of higher "consultation productivity" (u cθ > 0).
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The result in Proposition 1 does not depend on the GP's financial incentives (p c and p τ ). A fee change will scale up or down the optimal supply of the service in question but will not affect the change in marginal patient utility due to a change in patient SES. This has a straightforward implication for the applicability of our analysis in the Norwegian context, where there are two types of GP contracts: fee-for-service and fixed salary. All else equal, the optimal treatment decisions of the latter type of GPs is found by setting p c = p τ = 0 in the above analysis.
Corollary 1. The result in Proposition 1 does not depend on whether the GP has a fee-for-service contract or a fixed-salary contract.
In our empirical analysis, we measure SES by education and income. The measure of SES that more closely fits the main underlying assumption in the model is education. It is reasonable to expect that the quality of communication between GP and patient, and thus the quality of the consultation, is positively correlated with the patient's level of education. Besides being better able to communicate the nature and extent of his disease symptoms, a higher educated patient might also be able to better understand the GP's diagnosis and possible consequences. Using income as a measure of SES, the interpretation of our model is less clear. Although income is positively correlated with education, it is not obvious if and how the patient's income level in itself affects consultation quality. One possible channel of influence is that income is positively correlated with cognitive ability and might therefore pick up relevant patient characteristics that are not fully controlled for by the level of formal education.
Thus, if the conditions in Proposition 1 are satisfied, our model predicts that higher patient SES is associated with longer consultations and fewer medical tests per consultation. Based on the above discussion, we would expect that this pattern is more likely to hold for patient education and less likely to hold for patient income. Furthermore, we would expect that the relationship between patient SES and GP treatment decisions is similar for fee-for-service and fixed-salary GPs.
| DATA
| Data sources and variables
We have obtained unique administrative data with patient-level information on the services provided by GPs in Norway over a 5-year period from 2008 to 2012. Information on GPs' service provision is obtained from the Kontroll og utbetaling av helserefusjon (KUHR) register 25 that records all fee-for-service payments to GPs in Norway, covering the whole population of patients and GPs. 26 The data are detailed and allow us to observe, for each visit, the set of services provided by the GP, the consultation length, the total fee payments to the GP, and the patient's (main and secondary) diagnoses. Since the data include patient identifiers, we can also observe, for each patient, the number of visits, the set of tests, and the total fee payments to GPs per year. In order to reduce patient heterogeneity, we restrict the sample to patients with a given condition: diabetes type II. More precisely, we include all patients with at least one visit where diabetes type II (International Classification of Primary Care [ICPC]-code T90) is recorded as the main diagnosis by the GP during the sample period. Our choice of diagnosis has three advantages. First, it is a highly common disease, which implies that most GPs treat patients with this diagnosis.
27 Second, it is almost exclusively treated in primary care, 28 which limits concerns regarding patient selection.
Third, medical guidelines specify fairly standardised treatment of diabetes type II, which makes it reasonable to compare differences in GPs' service provision across patients. 24 Although the conditions given by Proposition 1 are reasonable and relatively mild, the regime defined by these conditions is obviously not the only possible regime. For example, the results might be reversed (i.e., ∂c Ã ∂θ <0 and ∂τ Ã ∂θ >0) if Φ is sufficiently large. Furthermore, if consultation length and testing are strongly complementary in the health production function, patients with higher SES might receive both longer consultations and more tests.
Because the data from the KUHR register contain patient and GP identifiers, we are able to merge data from other registers to obtain information on patient and GP characteristics. From Statistics Norway, we obtain data on patient characteristics, including age, gender, and our two SES variables: education and income. Information about GP characteristics are obtained from the regular GP database, 29 which contains information about the GP's age, gender, list size, and possible specialisation in general medicine.
30
Our dependent variables, which represent the GP's service provision, are measured using information only from visits, where diabetes type II is recorded as main diagnosis. In the main analysis, we focus on the service provision during a visit. In this case, we use medical testing, consultation length, and total expenditures as dependent variables. Medical testing is measured by two binary indicator variables showing whether the patient receives HbA1c test and a blood sugar test, respectively. These are the key tests for diabetes patients set out by medical guidelines. Consultation length is measured by an indicator variable for visits that exceed the standard consultation time of 20 min. Finally, total expenditures per visit are measured by the GP's total fee, which mainly includes the fee-for-service payment but possibly also copayments collected from the visiting patient.
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In an extension, we analyse the GP's service provision to each patient during a year. In this case, we use the number of visits and the total expenditures per patient per calendar year as our dependent variables. In addition, we include a variable that measures the likelihood that a given patient receives at least two HbA1c tests per year. Because this is defined as the minimum number of tests per year by the medical guidelines for diabetes, we can interpret this variable as a quality measure of the GP's service provision.
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The explanatory variable of prime interest is patients' SES, captured by education and income. Education is categorised in three levels: compulsory schooling, upper secondary education, and higher education. We restrict the sample to patients aged 25 and above at the time of consultation. The majority of patients are above 65 years of age.
33 Income is measured by individuals' (tax-registered) total income per year, including labour and capital income, as well as pensions. We use this as a continuous variable in the analysis.
To control for patient characteristics (other than SES) that may influence the GP's service provision, we include age, gender, and comorbidity variables. Comorbidity is captured by including a full set of indicators (comorbidity dummies) for the 17 ICPC-2 chapters.
34 Moreover, we control for patients' health by including two indicators of prior healthcare use: the number of GP visits in year t − 1 with diabetes as main diagnosis and with other diagnoses. This implies that observations in the first year of our sample period are excluded from our dependent variables described above. Finally, we include information about the GP's number of enlisted patients and whether the GP is a specialist in general medicine. A description of all variables used in the estimations is found in Table 1 . Table 1 shows descriptive statistics at the GP level, where means are taken first over each GP's patient population and then across all GPs for each year from 2009 to 2012. The variables capturing the GPs' service provision during a visit display only slight changes over the period. The relative frequency of prolonged consultations is very stable in the interval 41-43%, while there is a small increase (54% to 57%) in the relative frequency of HbA1c tests and a small decrease (47% to 44%) in the relative frequency of blood sugar tests. The total fee paid to GPs per visit is increasing by 8.2% over the period. 30 Becoming a specialist in general medicine requires at least 4 years of practice and training. For more details, see Brekke et al. (2017) who study how GPs respond to financial incentives by exploiting fee changes due to specialist certification. 31 Recall that there is a tight annual expenditure cap (below £200) on out-of-pocket payments, as explained in Section 2. For patients with chronic diseases, such as diabetes, this cap is most likely binding, implying that copayments constitute a small share of total health expenditures for this group of patients.
| Descriptive statistics
Regarding the GP's annual service provision per patient, we see that the share of patients who get at least two HbA1c tests is stable at slightly above 50%, whereas the total fee paid to GPs is increasing by 4.5% over the period. Regarding our SES indicators, the share of patients with low education is slightly decreasing (from 38% to 36%), whereas the average income per patient increases by 16% in nominal terms over the same period.
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To get a first impression of how GPs' service provision varies by patients' SES, we have, in Table 2 , split the sample by patients' educational level. The descriptive statistics show that patients with low education tend to get fewer prolonged consultations but more HbA1c and blood sugar tests per visit. However, the total GP fee, and thus expenditures, per visit is on average lower for patients with low education.
Regarding the GPs' service provision during a year, the descriptive statistics show that patients with low education on average visit the GP more often. Moreover, the total GP fee per year is higher for patients with low education, implying 36 The patients in our sample have on average lower education and income than the Norwegian population in general. During 2009 to 2012, the share of individuals with high education is 35%, and the average income is slightly above NOK 400,000. Note. GP = general practitioner; HbA1c = glycated haemoglobin.
*In this table, we present a single dummy for comorbidity for ease of presentation. In estimations, we include a full set of comorbidity dummies that represents the 17 International Classification of Primary Care code 2 chapters.
that the higher number of visits outweigh the lower GP fee per visit. Finally, patients with high education are less likely to get at least two HbA1c tests per year. The descriptive statistics also show that educational level is correlated with other patient characteristics. Patients with low education are on average older and more likely to be female. The share of patients with comorbidities appear to be equal across educational levels. However, there is large heterogeneity across diagnosing (ICPC-2) classes. 37 Finally, patients with low education visit the GP more often both for diabetes and other conditions. Because these variables are likely to affect the GPs' service provision, it is important to include them as controls in the empirical analysis.
| EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND RESULTS
As previously explained, our empirical strategy to account for patient heterogeneity is mainly to focus on a specific diagnosis, diabetes type II, that is almost exclusively treated by GPs. Our data allow us also to control for a wide-set of patient characteristics. Since GPs' service provision may also be driven by unobserved physician heterogeneity, we include GP fixed effects in the regressions that control for all time-invariant GP characteristics, including observable factors (e.g., age, gender, and office location) and unobservable factors (e.g., practice style, altruism, view on equity, and medical skills). 38 Figure 1 displays the distribution of GPs according to patients' educational level, showing that almost all GPs have patients in all three categories.
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Our main analysis is of the GPs' service provision during a visit. In this case, we estimate the following empirical model:
where the subscripts i, k, p, and t represent visit, GP, patient, and year, respectively. Y is our dependent variable capturing the GP's service provision during a visit, which is measured using binary indicators for service provision (prolonged consultation, HbA1c test, and blood sugar tests) and expenditures (the total fee paid to the GP). SES is our key explanatory variable, measured by the patient's educational level and yearly total income. We include both SES measures in the estimation, implying that we control for income when estimating the effect of education, and vice versa. PAT is a vector of patient characteristics, including age, gender, morbidity, and visits in year t -1. Morbidity is measured by including a dummy for each of the 37 The comorbidity shares across the different diagnosing (ICPC-2) classes are available upon request. 38 We have also estimated a simple ordinary least squares model. The effects are qualitatively the same but tend to be slightly stronger than those reported in Table 3 . The results from the ordinary least squares regressions are available upon request.
39 For instance, almost 1.5% of the GPs in our sample have no patients with low education, less than 1% have no patients with medium education, and almost 4.5% have no patients with high education. patient's comorbidities (if any), as defined by the 17 diagnosing (ICPC-2) classes. 40 GP is a vector of potentially time-varying GP characteristics, including the GP's list size and specialisation in general medicine. α k is the GP fixed effect and δ t captures possible time trends in service provision common to all GPs, which can be due to changes in fee schedules or medical guidelines. Finally, ε ikpt is an error term. The model is estimated with robust standard errors. The results, reported in Table 3 , show that GPs treat patients differently according to their SES. Patients with low education have almost 6 percentage points lower probability of receiving a prolonged consultation than patients with high education but 1 and 2 percentage points higher probability of getting HbA1c and blood sugar tests, respectively. The results for income show a different pattern, as patients with lower income are less likely to get both prolonged consultations and medical tests during a visit. Although being statistically significant, the effects are close to 0 in magnitude. 41 These results are in line with our theoretical prediction of a substitution effect between consultation length and medical testing, because the quality of consultation, which is based on patients' communicative (or cognitive) skills, is more likely to be correlated with education than with income. Finally, the results show that the GPs' total fee per visit is almost NOK 8 (or 2%) lower for patients with low education than for those with high education. The same pattern is present along the income dimension, although the effects are smaller in magnitude. Thus, patients with low SES tend to get less services per visit, when measured in monetary terms. This finding could indicate a social gradient in the GPs' service provision. We therefore investigate this further in the next section by analysing the GPs' service provision per patient during a year, which take into account also the frequency of visits that tends to be higher for patients with low SES, as indicated in Table 2 .
| EXTENSION: GP SERVICE PROVISION DURING A YEAR
Our analysis of GPs' service provision during a visit revealed, after accounting for patient and GP heterogeneity, that (a) patients with low education get more medical tests but shorter consultations, (b) patients with low income get less of both, and (c) patients with low education or income receive less services in monetary terms. Although the 40 We have also done the analysis using the full set of comorbidity indicators; that is, 707 dummies instead of the ICPC-2 chapter indicators. The results are nearly identical (available from the authors upon request). 41 Notice that the effects of education are obtained after controlling for income, and vice versa, and are therefore conservative as income and education are positively correlated (see Table 2 ). latter two findings may suggest a social gradient in the GPs' allocation of healthcare across patients, the analysis does not account for the number of visits to the GP. We therefore analyse the GPs' service provision to each patient during a year, using the same empirical approach as in Section 5. As dependent variables, we use the number of visits and the total GP fee per patient per (calendar) year.
42 As a quality measure of the GPs' service provision, we also include the probability that a patient gets at least two HbA1c tests per year. The explanatory variables are the same as in Equation 6, except that we exclude the number of visits in year t -1 to avoid potential endogeneity problems. The results, reported in Table 4 , show that patients with lower SES visit the GP more often. Patients with low education have 0.18 (4.3%) more visits per year than patients with high education. Moreover, patients with low SES tend to receive more services per year when measured in monetary terms. The annual expenditures per patient, measured by the GPs' total fee, are around NOK 30 (1.8%) higher for patients with low education than for those with high education. Finally, patients with low education are 2.5 percentage points (4.0%) more likely to get at least two HbA1c tests per year, although the effect of income is insignificant. Given that our analysis goes a long way towards accounting for patient and GP heterogeneity, these results indicate that GPs tend to overcompensate patients with low SES in their service provision. Thus, our analysis finds that GPs systematically treat patients differently according to their SES but does not suggest a social gradient in the allocation of healthcare.
| ROBUSTNESS AND HETEROGENEITY CHECKS
We perform several checks for robustness and heterogeneity of the findings reported in Table 3 . This section contains a brief summary of the main results, with further details given in Appendix B.
42 As before, we only include visits where diabetes type II is recorded as the main diagnosis. In order to control for potential selection effects in the matching between patients and GPs, we exploit the presence of exogenous GP switches in our data (caused by GPs who quit, retire, move, or die) and restrict the sample to patients who experience an exogenous change of GP. Furthermore, in order to deal with potential problems of unobserved patient heterogeneity, we also restrict the sample to siblings and estimate our main model using sibling fixed effects. In both cases, the results (reported in Tables B1 and B2, respectively) are qualitatively similar to our results for the whole sample and therefore provide confirmation of our main analysis.
We also extend our analysis to consider heterogeneity in observable patient and GP characteristics. Regarding patient characteristics, we explore the potential role of different opportunity costs of GP visits by splitting the sample according to whether the patient is above or below 67 years of age, which for several decades has been the formal retirement age in Norway. The results (reported in Table B3 ) are qualitatively the same and thus not sensitive to whether the patients are retired or not. Regarding GP characterstics, we estimate our empirical model on a number of different subsamples of GPs: (a) male versus female, (b) aged below or above 50, (c) specialist versus nonspecialist, (d) number of enlisted patients below or above the mean, and (e) fee-for-service versus fixed-salary contract. Although there are some differences in the magnitude of the estimated coefficients, the results (reported in Table B4 ) are remarkably consistent in qualitative terms across all these subsamples and, by implication, similar to the results from our main analysis. In particular, it is worth noting the similarity of behaviour between fee-for-service and fixed-salary GPs, which confirms our theoretical predictions.
| CONCLUDING REMARKS
The aim of this paper is to shed light on the empirical fact that individuals with lower SES tend to be in worse health than individuals with higher SES (the "social gradient"). There are many sources of such a relationship. In this paper, we have focused on a direct channel to health inequalities, namely the provision of healthcare.
Exploiting rich administrative panel data with patient-level information on GPs' service provision over a 5-year period in Norway, we find that GPs treat patients differently according to their SES. Patients with low education receive shorter consultations but more medical tests per visit. Patients with low income receive shorter consultations and fewer medical tests per visit, but the associations are very small. These findings accord with a theoretical model where consultation quality is increasing in patients' communicative (or cognitive) skills that are more likely to be correlated with education than with income.
We also find that patients with low education or income receive less services per visits but more services per year when measured in monetary terms, measured by the fee payments to the GPs. The reason is that patients with low education or income visit their GP more often. Furthermore, patients with low education are more likely to get at least two HbA1c tests, as recommended by the medical guidelines. Thus, although patients' SES affect the GPs' treatment decisions during a single visit, we find no evidence of a social gradient in the overall allocation of healthcare. By way of conclusion, we should stress a few possible caveats. First, focusing on one specific diagnosis may raise concern about the generality of the results. Diabetes is a common disease that is treated almost exclusively by GPs but also closely related to individual behaviour and lifestyle. This can be an advantage when studying the relationship with SES but may also imply that our study is only valid for similar types of diseases. However, many of our results are in line with existing primary care studies. 43 Second, the GPs' treatment choices may to some extent be driven by patient behaviour. In particular, patients with low (high) SES visit their GP more (less) often, which may induce the GP to treat such patients less (more) intensive per visit. However, we do find that patients receive a different mixture of services according to their educational level. Third, the data allow us to analyse the relationship between patients' SES and GPs' service provision but not to study the impact on health outcomes and in turn SES-related health inequalities. This is a question of great importance, which is on our agenda for future research. Finally, another important question is whether the GPs' distribute services in an equitable way across patients. To answer this question, one need to define what is "appropriate" or "fair" inequalities in healthcare. The literature on this topic usually measures departures from "horizontal equity"-the appropriately equal treatment of people who are alike in relevant respects-applying the principle of "equal access for equal need". This question is beyond the scope of our study and thus left for future research.
